[OpenWireless Tech] A small question about tracking

"Andy Green (林安廸)" andy at warmcat.com
Tue Nov 6 08:34:43 PST 2012


On 11/07/12 00:22, the mail apparently from Eugene Smiley included:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 10:41 AM, "Andy Green (林安廸)" <andy at warmcat.com
> <mailto:andy at warmcat.com>> wrote:
>
>     It doesn't, it runs from the client (laptop, phone) to his VPN server.
>
>
> It COULD. It could be designed either way. Currently nothing is written
> in stone.

No, if it is to be useful the VPN must run from the client to a server 
private to the client.

>     The AP must be fundamentally untrusted by the client, and the AP
>     owner must take the approach his clients are completely untrusted
>     too.  That way, both can be safe.
>
>
> One thing you have to deal with is the complexity of your design

Hm?  Have you any idea how complex WLAN modulation is :?)  This is simple.

> Assuming the client is untrustable (which is likely) means you have to

If the client is "untrusted" is a decision the AP makes.  It should 
assume it is untrusted.  Likewise, the client must mistrust the AP for 
everything.  It's OK it allows both to be safe.

> capture all non-VPN traffic and reroute it through a VPN tunnnel on the
> router anyway.

There is no non-VPN traffic allowed.  Packet filter rules only allow 
stateful VPN udp connections.

> The alternatives are:
> - Captive Portal with installation instructions that are idiot proof.
> Idiot proof is never really idiot proof.
> - Rerouting all non-VPN traffic through TOR but then you have no way of
> helping clients secure themselves.
>
> Ultimately it's the clients responsibility to keep their house in order.
> We can make it easy for them to do that or we can make it hard.

You have the wrong idea.

There is no alternative to VPN traffic, that is all that is allowed.

-Andy




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