[Sovereign Keys] A design question: How should timelines and mirrors operate?

[Erik Tews]

Yes, my question was more, how does the client decide, which timelines
it trusts/tracks, and how is this updated? At the moment, this point is
a bit vague in the design document. As you outlined, when too many
timelines are not operational anymore, the whole system stops working.
So if a timeline goes down, it needs to be replaced rather soon then
late.

Am Dienstag, den 28.02.2012, 09:27 +0100 schrieb g.koppena:
> > All client, that insist opon this timeline would act like under an
> > attack, because no fresh responses from this timeline are available
> > anymore.
> 
> Forgot to point you to
> 
> "MAX_DERELICT_TIMELINES=2    # Timelines are derelict if nobody is
> seeing updates
>                             # from them.  We will tolerate this number
> of them"
> 
> in the algorithm outlined in section 4.b. as well...
> 
> 
> Georg
> 
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