[SSL Observatory] Widespread RNG vulnerabilities discovered using Observatory data

Phillip Hallam-Baker hallam at gmail.com
Wed Feb 15 16:32:47 PST 2012


Making a contact list is not a problem, making it public needs a bit of thought.



On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 4:37 PM, Ondrej Mikle <ondrej.mikle at nic.cz> wrote:
> On 02/15/2012 08:19 PM, Peter Eckersley wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 06:11:49PM -0800, Peter Eckersley wrote:
>>
>> This seems consistent with Nadia Heninger's claim that these are
>> exclusively routers, VPN devices and other embedded systems:
>>
>> https://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/nadiah/new-research-theres-no-need-panic-over-factorable-keys-just-mind-your-ps-and-qs
>>
>> Apologies for panicking any CAs over this, it seems as though router and VPN
>> manufacturers will have responsibility for responding to this problem.
>
> Don't beat yourself over it :-) With all due respect to Lenstra et al. (the work
> they did was good), the data originally provided by them made the case
> (unintentionally) sound scarier than it is.
>
> Though the idea to make a public "CA security email address contact list" would
> be still nice. For example, I've run into a dead-end when reporting yet-unknown
> certs with weak 512-bit keys with the right KU and EKU extensions for code
> signing to a CA (it was around the time when malware signed by factorized keys
> became rampant; the CA in question was trusted by Mozilla and Microsoft). The
> only officially listed contact did not respond at all (I guess only disclosure
> in a list made them to actually revoke them weeks later).
>
> Also, I'd like to add a comment on keys shared by "often uninvolved parties". I
> had a discussion with Ralph Holz about our results in key-sharing and we agreed
> that in many cases, it is really hard to find out whether parties are involved
> or not (meaning: lot of manual checking of financial registries and whatnot;
> hard to automatize). Nevertheless, there are e.g. VPS hostings that simply copy
> over installation image and do not change keys.
>
> There is also some key-sharing among RAs and CAs in CA-certs (with different
> policies stated in CPS for the products), an example (full graph of such certs
> is still on my TODO list):
>
> -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
> MIIFAzCCA+ugAwIBAgIQTM1KmltFEyGMz5AviytRcTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCB
> lzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlVUMRcwFQYDVQQHEw5TYWx0IExha2Ug
> Q2l0eTEeMBwGA1UEChMVVGhlIFVTRVJUUlVTVCBOZXR3b3JrMSEwHwYDVQQLExho
> dHRwOi8vd3d3LnVzZXJ0cnVzdC5jb20xHzAdBgNVBAMTFlVUTi1VU0VSRmlyc3Qt
> SGFyZHdhcmUwHhcNMDYwOTE4MDAwMDAwWhcNMjAwNTMwMTA0ODM4WjBxMQswCQYD
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> YWxmb3JkMRowGAYDVQQKExFDb21vZG8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDEXMBUGA1UEAxMOUG9z
> aXRpdmVTU0wgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC9T3lY
> IpPJKD5SEQAvwKkgitctVR4Q57h/4oYqpOxe6eSSWJZUDfMXukGeFZFV78LuACAY
> RYMm3yDMPbOhEzEKIVx5g3mrJBVcVvC0lZih2tIb6ha1y7ewwVP5pEba8C4kuGKe
> joteK1qWoOpQ6Yj7KCpNmpxIT4O2h65Pxci12f2+P9GnncYsEw3AAcezcPOPabuw
> PBDf6wkAhD9u7/zjLbTHXRHM9/Lx9uLjAH4SDt6NfQDKOj32cuh5JaYIFveriP9W
> XgkXwFqCBWI0KyhIMpfQhAysExjbnmbHqhSLEWlN8QnTul2piDdi2L8Dm53X5gV+
> wmpSqo0HgOqODvMdAgMBAAGjggFuMIIBajAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBShcl8mGyiYQ5Vd
> BzfVhZadS9LDRTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUuMoR6QYxedvDlMboGSq8uzUWMaQwDgYDVR0P
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> Y3J0LmNvbW9kb2NhLmNvbS9VVE5BZGRUcnVzdFNlcnZlckNBLmNydDA5BggrBgEF
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> jGfibfZKhWaDtjJNn0IjF9dFQWp2BNStuY9u3MI+6VHyntjzf/tQKvCL/W8NIjYu
> zg5G8t6P2jt9HpOs/PQyKw+rAR+lQI/jJJkfXbKqDLnioeeSDJBLU30fKO5WPa8Y
> Z0nf1R7CqJgrTEeDgUwuRMLvyGPui3tbMfYmYb95HLCpTqnJUHvi
> -----END CERTIFICATE-----
>
> -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
> MIIE0DCCA7igAwIBAgIQMKeebbHpGVqxyFDTln1j1TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBv
> MQswCQYDVQQGEwJTRTEUMBIGA1UEChMLQWRkVHJ1c3QgQUIxJjAkBgNVBAsTHUFk
> ZFRydXN0IEV4dGVybmFsIFRUUCBOZXR3b3JrMSIwIAYDVQQDExlBZGRUcnVzdCBF
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> AQoCggEBAL1PeVgik8koPlIRAC/AqSCK1y1VHhDnuH/ihiqk7F7p5JJYllQN8xe6
> QZ4VkVXvwu4AIBhFgybfIMw9s6ETMQohXHmDeaskFVxW8LSVmKHa0hvqFrXLt7DB
> U/mkRtrwLiS4Yp6Oi14rWpag6lDpiPsoKk2anEhPg7aHrk/FyLXZ/b4/0aedxiwT
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> -----END CERTIFICATE-----
>
> Ondrej



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