[SSL Observatory] Syrian fake certificate for Facebook

Danny O'Brien DObrien at cpj.org
Thu May 5 13:28:19 PDT 2011


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http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2011/05/05/did-syria-replace-facebooks-security-certificate-with-a-forged-one/

http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/certificate.jpg

Looks like it's not signed by a vouched CA. 

I've actually had a smattering of reports of such fake (but not CA-signed) certificates in the wild from across the world (Central America, S.E. Asia, and now the Middle East). The explanation could be as much the widespread use of MiTM tools by petty criminals in cyber-cafes aimed at tourists as they are by state attackers – I get to hear about their use in repressive regimes more, but that might be just selection bias at work.

Does anyone else see more of these examples? Enough to see a trend, either in casual criminal use in easily MiTM environments, or on wired ISPs (implying a more established adversary)?

d.

- -- 
Danny O'Brien
Internet Advocacy Coordinator
Committee to Protect Journalists
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